ABSTRACT: In recent years, many studies have highlighted the unprecedented growth in security threats from multiple and varied sources faced by corporate as well as governmental organizations. People inside the organization with ready access to confidential or proprietary data can easily violate the organization security policy, maliciously or inadvertently, without being caught. In order to protect their reputation and valuable assets, many organizations take the dramatic but necessary step of deploying and operating employee surveillance and monitoring tools within their network perimeters. In this chapter, we discuss employee surveillance schemes from both technological and legal perspectives. We argue that keystroke dynamics could be used to fight effectively against insider threat, and as such it could play an important role in employee surveillance. We present a keystroke recognition scheme based on free text detection that goes beyond the traditional approach of using keystroke dynamics for authentication or employee performance evaluation, and consider using such information for dynamic user profiling. The generated profiles can be used to identify reliably perpetrators in the event of security breach. Such form of user profiling provides a very effective way of combating insider threat that is less intrusive to individual privacy.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many studies have highlighted the unprecedented growth in security threats from multiple and varied sources (Denning, 1987) . Traditional protection mechanisms such as firewall and intrusion detection systems primarily focus on hacking threats originating from outside the organization network perimeter, whereas people inside the organization with ready access to confidential or proprietary data can easily violate the organization security policy, maliciously or inadvertently, without being caught (Ahmed, 2003; Ahmed, 2005) . Hence, insiders pose the greatest challenge to data protection. It has been reported that insiders represent the sources of over half of the security and privacy breaches faced by most organizations. Malicious activity by an insider may expose his organization to credibility lost, or significant financial lost related to lost business or lawsuits.
In order to protect their reputation and valuable assets, many organizations take the dramatic but necessary step of deploying and operating employee surveillance and monitoring tools within their network perimeters (Zimmerman, 2002) . The rationale behind such approach is that secure management of organization information assets largely depend on the behavior of the employees. Employees are typically involved in all aspects of information flows within an organization. They are producers or end-users of the organization information asset, and have easier access to it compared with outsiders.
So mismanagement or misuse of such information by an employee can have devastating impact on the company. One class of tools that have gained in popularity in the realm of employee surveillance technologies is keystroke monitor. Keystroke monitors can be used to generate and analyze two different kinds of information: the keystrokes data and the keystroke dynamics. The keystrokes data can be used to reconstruct the actual information typed by the user such as the commands or programs run, or the messages typed etc. Keystroke dynamics have so far been used, in existing surveillance technologies, only for employee work performance monitoring purpose by determining and logging, for instance, the employee typing speed. Prior research has shown that keystroke dynamics can also be used for protection. However, the focus of these research works has mostly been on using keystroke dynamics for authentication (Bleha et al., 1990; Brown, 1993; Bergadano, 2002) . We argue that keystroke dynamics could be used to fight effectively against insider threat, and as such it could play an important role in employee surveillance. To achieve this goal we need to go beyond the traditional approach of using keystroke dynamics for authentication or employee performance evaluation, and consider using such information for dynamic user profiling. The generated profiles can be used to identify reliably perpetrators in the event of security breach. Such form of user profiling provides a very effective way of combating insider threat that is less intrusive to individual privacy.
Although a rich body of research work has been accomplished in the area of keystroke dynamics biometrics, the focus has mostly been on fixed-text detection, which requires typing a fixed or known string (Gaines et al. 1980; Bleha et al., 1990; Legget, 1991; Brown, 1993; Bergadano, 2002) . This restricts the applicability of most existing keystroke dynamics technologies to access control, and eliminates the possibility of using them for dynamic and passive user monitoring. In this context, dynamic and passive monitoring requires free-text detection. Free-text detection of keystroke dynamics is a challenging area in which few works have been published so far. In this chapter, we present a new technique for free-text detection of keystroke that can be used for passive and dynamic user monitoring. By allowing dynamic and passive user monitoring, the proposed technology can be used to track reliably and continuously legitimate and illegitimate users throughout computing sessions. By collecting only user keystroke dynamics instead of actual keystrokes data, our technique limit the amount of personal information gathered. This protects to some extent the privacy of the monitored individuals, compared with existing surveillance technologies.
While the case for employee surveillance can be made, most of the technologies used so far infringe significantly on the privacy of the employees. Existing surveillance technologies record sensitive information such as telecommunications records, logs of web usages, email messages, details about employees computer usage or work habits etc. Such sensitive information is stored in organization servers exposing them to possible theft by hackers and identity fraudsters. Privacy advocates and many other critics argue that existing employee surveillance technologies simply violate the privacy of employee, which is a fundamental personal right. In this context, there is a need to balance on one hand the need for organizations to protect their information assets against insider threat and on the other hand the right for privacy of employees. In Section 2, we discuss insider threat and give a general overview of existing employee surveillance technologies. We also discuss the use of biometrics technologies for workplace surveillance and take the opportunity to discuss the privacy issues involved in employee surveillance. In Section 3, we give an overview of keystroke dynamics recognition technology and review related work on free-text detection of keystrokes. We also introduce a new approach for free-text detection of keystrokes, and discuss its use in the context of employee surveillance. In Section 4, we discuss future trends, and finally in Section 5, we make some concluding remarks.
BACKGROUND
In this section we give an overview of insider threat and discuss employee surveillance which represents the most widely used countermeasures against such threat. We also discuss biometrics technologies which form part of many surveillance strategies, and we end the section by discussing the privacy considerations underlying employee surveillance.
Insider Threats
Previous attempts have been made to study and characterize insiders' threats. In this regard, the Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) and the CERT Coordination Center of Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering Institute (CERT/CC) conducted a more comprehensive study examining insiders' threats from both behavioral and technical perspectives (Randazzo et al., 2004; Keeney et al. 2005) . The Insider Threat Study (ITS) produced through these joint efforts, analyzed insider threats across various sectors, including banking and finance, information and telecommunications, government, and critical infrastructures, and suggested some remedies. Some of the findings of this study include the following: -Most insider incidents involve little technical sophistication or complexity. -Most of the insider incidents are planned in advance, and do not just happen as random isolated actions. -Most of the incidents are driven by financial motives rather than the will to harm the organization. -Perpetrators have various profiles and background, and may hold various positions in the organization. -Incidents are detected using various methods or technologies.
It is important to understand the motives and the psychology of insider criminals in order to be able to design effective countermeasures. Insider threat may originate from the people who design, maintain or operate the target systems. The growing reliance on computing systems increases the dependence on people such as developers, system administrator and operators. As a result, secure operation of sensitive systems relies to a large extent on how trustworthy these individuals are. An insider attack originating from such individuals can have dramatic consequences.
Insider attack may originate from disgruntled employees who have been fired or transferred, or who are angry at their management for various reasons. Insider crimes may also be committed by employees who take advantage of their position to achieve financial gains by, for instance, facilitating or participating in the activities of an established hacker group or an organized crime ring. There are also many reported cases of insider crimes committed by the so-called "moles", who are individuals who get them hired by an organization with the specific intent of conducting espionage or other fraudulent activities.
In order to limit the occurrence or the impact of insider acts a broad range of measures are currently being studied or used by organizations. These measures can broadly be categorized into behavioral and technological. Behavioral measures are based on the assumption that insider acts are based on a combination of predisposing traits of the individuals as well as specific characteristics or context of the organization environment. Such measures involve establishing psychological profiles of perpetrators which can be used in pre-employment screening as well as in monitoring the activity of technology specialists. Technological measures consist of implementing and deploying in the organization hacker monitoring devices or software. We discuss in detail these technologies in the next section.
Employee Surveillance Technologies
The primary reasons for electronic surveillance of workers include the following: -Legal liability -Security concerns -Legal compliance -Employee productivity and performance reviews In order to achieve these objectives, several features are required in typical surveillance technologies. Common features of employee surveillance technologies include: -Monitoring how employees use their computers by logging, for instance, which sites they visit, how often they visit specific sites, and how much time they spend surfing the web. -Greater control over employees' computers by enforcing strict policies, for instance, by restricting which programs they can run, or by filtering out certain web sites or blocking certain emails.
Employee surveillance technologies broadly fall into three categories: computer surveillance, camera surveillance, and tracking surveillance. Camera surveillance includes technologies such as closed circuit television (CCTV), facial recognition systems etc. Tracking surveillance includes technologies such as global positioning systems (GPS). Popular examples of computer surveillance include email or web monitoring systems. We are interested in this chapter primarily in computer surveillance technologies. For this kind of technologies, the main monitoring targets include:
-Web connections -E-mail communications -Storage and reviews of computer files -Video recording of job performance -Storage and review of voice-mail messages
Computer surveillance programs can broadly be classified into two categories according to their scope and target: host-based technologies and network-based technologies (Wakefield, 2004) .
Network-based programs are deployed on the employer's network, and as such they typically monitor and log network activities such as email communications and web surfing. The recorded data can be used to profile individual users, and the derived profiles can be used to identify individual employees in case of security breach. Some surveillance technologies allow managers to randomly access employee computer screens, and inspect them or take snapshots. E-mail monitoring represents a significant component of surveillance technologies in use in most organizations. Organizations are legally liable for all communications originating from their networks. This put organizations at risk of lawsuits if employees are involved in unlawful activities such as harassment or discrimination. E-mail monitoring software parses e-mail messages for keywords that may refer to unacceptable or illegal activities. A good example of network-based surveillance technology is the Vontu data loss prevention software developed by Vontu Inc (Vontu). Vontu data loss prevention software prevents data confidentiality breach from inside by monitoring inbound and outbound network traffic, and blocking web, email or FTP communications that violate the organization security policy. Another example of network-based surveillance product is the e-mail and web monitoring systems developed by Elron Software (Elron). The Email module monitors the presence of certain keywords, files or attachments that, when detected, forward the corresponding message to the security or system administrator for review. The web module filters out or blocks blacklisted sites such as porn sites. Network-based surveillance systems are practical and cost-effective because they allow the employer to monitor several users simultaneously. They are, however, limited in the sense that they cannot monitor local activities occurring on employees' computers, which do not require network connections.
Host-based technologies are needed to monitor and report such local activities. Some host-based surveillance technologies record the programs installed and run by the employee, the amount of time the employee is away from his desk or the computer remains idle. Other products allow the employer to monitor keystrokes on employees' computers. Keystroke monitoring can be used to assess employees' performance by measuring their typing speed and comparing this against company standards. Keystroke logging can also be used to reconstruct the actual information generated through the employees computing sessions. Keystroke logging addresses a key limitation of networkbased technologies, which is their inability to deal with encrypted traffic.
It is important to note that the fact that host-based surveillance technologies are deployed on an employee's machine doesn't necessarily indicate that the employee is aware of it. Quite often the program runs passively without knowledge of the user. Sebek, a popular kernel-based key logger developed by the honeynet project, provides an effective illustration of how a host-based surveillance technology works (Sebek) . The Sebek distribution consists of two modules: the client module, which is installed on the monitored machine, and the server module, which is located on a separate secure server machine. The Sebek client resides in the kernel space instead of the user space where the shell is running. So it evades detection by the user. The Sebek client captures the keystrokes without the user noticing it, and transmits them to the Sebek server, which logs them. In doing that, it ensures that the system cannot block the transmission. Sebek provides the capability of capturing and decoding encrypted activity whether local or over SSH and SS connections or capturing and decoding passwords used to login locally or remotely etc.
Biometrics Recognition Systems
Biometrics recognition systems form part of the surveillance technologies deployed in many organizations. Biometrics is commonly used for access control to secured facilities or in conjunction with monitoring systems such as closed circuit television. These allow employers to verify employees work time and attendance, but at the same time protect employees against employers' manipulations or mistakes in maintaining such records. Recent years have seen an increasing interest in biometric systems; the underlying technology has improved and the costs involved have been reduced considerably. Biometrics technologies are widely used in various security applications, and are considered among the most accurate and efficient security systems in the market. In the Oxford dictionary, the definition of the noun "biometrics" is given as the "the application of statistical analysis to biological data" (Pearsall, 2001 ). In the particular field of computer security, biometrics is defined as the automated use of a collection of factors describing human behavioral or physiological characteristics to establish or verify a precise identity (Matyas, 2003) .
Biometrics technologies are commonly categorized into two different classes: physiological and behavioral. Examples of physiological characteristics include hand or finger images, facial characteristics, speaker verification, and iris recognition. Behavioral characteristics are traits that are learned or acquired. Dynamic signature verification and keystroke dynamics are two examples of behavioral characteristics. Not all biometrics technologies are appropriate or being used for employee surveillance. Voice and Face recognition systems are the most appropriate physiological biometrics for this application. However, several implementation attempts faced a number of privacy concerns. A (legal) case concerning the use of biometrics for authentication was initiated when four Telus (a Canadian Telephone Operator) employees complained that the company forces them to consent to the collection of their voice biometrics to gain access to a number of services. The employees refused the idea of converting their recorded voice to a biometric template. The case was closed to the favor of the company when the court found that the process is appropriate with regards to the company's business interests and that the consent meets the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act requirements (PIPEDA). Keystroke dynamics is one the most suitable behavioral biometric for employee surveillance (more details are given later).
Biometric recognition requires comparing an enrolled biometric sample (biometric template) against a newly captured biometric sample (for example, finger scan provided at an access attempt). A three-step process (Acquire, Process, and Store) should be executed every time the user presents his biometric sample to the system as follows.
1. Acquire: Raw biometric data is acquired by a sensing device, such as the image produced by a fingerprint scanning device, or the data collected by a keystroke event logger. Raw biometric data usually contains noise and cannot be used as is to automatically compare between users.
Process:
The raw data is processed to build a biometric model (template). This model consists of a number of extracted distinguishing features which are represented in a mathematical format.
Store:
The biometric template is stored in a database with all other collected information, (like claimed identity, date, time). This process is required in order to secure enough data for the user enrollment process. Some of the biometric systems implementations don't permanently store the generated template during recognition process. This is usually the case for non-audited access control systems. However storing such data increases the accountability of the system. Since the biometric template contains all the data representing the user biometric characteristics to the system there is no need to store the raw data. It is also not possible to reconstruct the raw data from the generated biometric template.
Biometric systems operate in one of three modes: Enrollment, Verification, and Validation modes. In most of the implementations the same hardware is used for the three modes. During enrollment mode, a reference biometric model is generated for the user. This model can be developed using number of the templates already stored in the database for the same user or it can be based only on one template. The reference model is stored in the database for future comparisons.
In the verification mode a 1 to 1 matching process is performed by comparing the calculated biometric template to the enrolled user reference model. In this mode the user will provide other information to the system to claim a specific identity. The decision will be made based on the comparison result. If the two samples are highly deviated from each other, this will indicate that the user is not who he claimed to be. In identification mode a 1 to N matching process is performed by comparing the calculated biometric template to the reference models for all of the enrolled users. The matching process should be able to detect the similarities in the compared models and select the closest reference model to the collected sample. The result of this process is either an identity confirmation or a non-match. This mode is mainly used in forensic applications where a proof of the identity of a suspect is not known in advance.
In order to evaluate the accuracy of a biometric system, the following metrics should be computed:
False Acceptance Rate (FAR):
the ratio between the number of occurrences of accepting a non-authorized user compared to the number of access trials.
False Rejection Rate (FRR):
the ratio between the number of false alarms caused by rejecting an authorized user compared to the number of access trials.
Failure to Enroll (FTE):
the ratio characterizing the number of times the system is not able to enroll a user's biometric features; this failure is caused by poor quality samples during enrollment mode.
Failure to Capture (FTC):
the ratio characterizing the number of times the system is not able to process the captured raw biometric data and extract features from it; this occurs when the captured data does not contain sufficient information to be processed.
Mean Time to Enroll (MTTE)
: the mean time needed to build a reference template for a user. This includes the time needed to collect the biometric samples and the time needed to process the samples and build the reference template.
Mean Time to Detect (MTTD):
the mean time needed to detect or verify user identity after presentation of the user data to the system. This includes the time needed to acquire the biometric sample, build the template and compare it to the reference template/templates to make the decision.
FAR and FRR values can vary significantly depending on the sensitivity of the biometric data comparison algorithm used in the verification/identification mode; FTE and FTC represent the sensitivity of the raw data processing module. In order to tune the accuracy of the system to its optimum value, it is important to study the effect of each factor on the other. In particular the relation between the achieved FAR and FRR when changing main system parameters is important in tuning the system. If the system is designed to minimize FAR to make the system more secure (e.g., for access control systems and intrusion detection systems), FRR will increase. On the other hand, if the system is designed to decrease FRR (e.g., for forensic applications) by increasing the tolerance to input variations and noise, FAR will increase. The optimal tuning point is calculated based on the application requirements and the aimed level of security.
Privacy Concerns
Employee surveillance technologies raise a lot of privacy concerns, heating the debate between privacy advocates and proponents of employee surveillance practices (GAO, 2002) . Proponents argue that observing and tracking employee behavior is necessary to reduce the risks to which organizations are exposed. In opposition to this view, critics claim that surveillance technologies violate fundamental personal rights of employees, and that quite often too much information about workers are collected, without any oversight of regulatory bodies over how the data are used, stored or secured. In this debate, one of the arguments that give an edge to employers is the need to comply with standards set by regulatory bodies such as the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) for the administrative, technical and physical safety of customer records. The FTC's standards set three main objectives for organizations:
-Ensure security and privacy of customer records.
-Protect against external as well as internal threats to the security and integrity of customer records. -Protect against unauthorized access or use of customer records that may result in substantial damage to the reputation, health, or wealth of the customer.
In this context, data security laws consider that privacy and safety concerns of customer information have higher priority than any privacy expectations of employees. Most employers use this as the legal ground to monitor their employees. Prior court rulings consider that reasonableness is the standard for electronic surveillance of workers. The employer needs to show that there is a business purpose, and also that there is an electronic monitoring policy in place for which employees have given informed consent. Legal experts advise that, through such policy, the employer should inform employees of the purpose of monitoring activities and related rules, and make sure to remove any privacy expectations in the workplace. The business case for electronic surveillance made by most employers is the need to comply with regulatory statutes and to reduce other employees' risks.
Under such considerations, employers must provide all employees with prior notice indicating the type of surveillance and when it will take place, whether it is intermittent or continuous, and whether it is impending or ongoing. Employers must also take appropriate measures to ensure the protection of the collected data, and avoid improper disclosure or use.
KEYSTROKE DYNAMICS RECOGNITION SYSTEMS
In this section, we review related work on free text detection of keystrokes, and present a new approach that uses neural networks for biometrics analysis.
State of the Art
Since the early 1980's a rich body of research has been produced in the area of keystroke dynamics recognition (Gaines et al. 1980; Bleha et al., 1990; Legget, 1991; Brown, 1993; Bergadano, 2002) . Most of these works focus on using this technology for user authentication or access control. Keystroke dynamics recognition systems measure the dwell time and flight time for keyboard actions. The raw data collected for keystroke includes the time a key is depressed and the time the key is released. Based on this data, the duration of keystroke (i.e., length of time a key is depressed), and the latency between consecutive keystrokes are calculated and used to construct a set of digraphs, trigraphs or n-graphs producing a pattern identifying the user. Because of the time limitation of the identification process, the user is asked to type a pre-defined word or a set of words in order to get reasonable amount of data for the identification. During the enrollment process, the user is also required to enter the same fixed text.
For dynamic and passive monitoring, we need to be able to detect the user without requiring him to enter a predefined message or text. So free text detection is essential for our purpose. However, free text detection presents huge challenges, which explain the limited number of related work available in the literature.
Monrose and Rubin authored one of the earliest works on free text detection of keystrokes (Monrose, 1997) . They collected typing samples from 42 users over a period of 7 weeks, during their routine computing usage, without any particular constraint. The collected timing data consist of keystroke durations and latencies. To recognize individual users, they cluster the data using a clustering algorithm to partition the data into cluster domains. The typing speed or number of words typed per minute in a given profile is used as the clustering criteria. Various distance measures were studied along with the clustering scheme, including Normalized Euclidian distance, and weighted and non-weighted maximum probability measures. Although the authors obtain 90% correct classification for fixed text detection, they obtain at best (using the weighted probability measure) only 23% correct classification for free text detection.
In the experimental approach adopted by Dowland et al., typing samples are collected by monitoring users during their regular computing activities, without any particular constraints imposed on them (Dowland et al., 2002) . A user profile is determined by calculating the mean and standard deviation of digraph latency and by considering only the diagraphs occurring a minimum number of times across the collected typing samples. By collecting and analyzing data for five users they achieve correct acceptance rates in the range of 60%.
More recently, Guneti and Picardi used the degree of disorder of an array to discriminate between two different typing samples (Guneti, 2005) . The degree of disorder of an array is computed by summing the distances between the positions of its elements, with respect to the positions of the same elements in the ordered array. The only timing information considered in their experiments is the time at which a key is depressed. Given two typing samples, they extract the n-graphs commonly occurring in both samples with corresponding timing information, and compute the distances between these samples. The distance d n (S 1 , S 2 ) between samples S 1 and S 2 , with respect to their common n-graphs, is computed. Based on these basic distance measures, they define some more sophisticated distance measure that they use to compare different typing samples. They evaluated their technique through a set of experiments involving 205 individuals, achieving a FAR of 0.00489% and a FRR of less than 5%.
We propose in this work a new approach for free text detection of keystroke dynamics, which introduces and uses a digraph approximation technique based on sorted time mapping. Although our approach is different from the one proposed by Guneti and Picardi, it achieves comparable performance.
Proposed Approach
The enrollment process in any keystroke dynamics detection system requires the existence of an enrollment sample, which is used to compute the behavior of the user. This sample should contain all possible key combinations in order to efficiently detect based on expected or unexpected set of user input. The first challenge facing a free text detection system is the ability to enroll a user using a non-predefined set of data. This allows both monitoring the user on the fly and non-intrusively by totally hiding the detection process from the user. Another challenge is to be able to provide information about the user identity based on a minimal amount of non-deterministic input. This is very important in practice as in most cases it will not be possible to force an attacker to provide more data and a decision should be made based only on this data.
The detection approach we introduce for free text detection addresses those challenges by utilizing a digraph approximation technique, which is based on sorted time mapping. The approach utilizes neural networks to simulate and analyze the user behavior based on the encoded set of digraphs. Figure 1 illustrates the enrollment process. Raw data collected from a specific user's sessions are processed and converted to a digraph format. A digraph represents a typing action performed by the user from a specific key to another key on the keyboard. The time calculated in each digraph consists of the sum of the dwell times (the time needed to click on the key) and the flight time (the time required to move from one key to another). Generated digraphs are sent as a batch to the digraph-sorting module, which computes a mapping table. In order to calculate the mapping table for the provided set of digraphs, digraphs are sorted twice. The first time, they are sorted according to the average of the times of all digraphs with the same code in the from-key. The second time, they are sorted according to the average of the to-key. A key code is mapped to its sort order according to whether it is to or from. The output-mapping table is stored for each of the enrolled users. The next step of the enrollment process consists of training a neural network with collected digraphs after applying the mapping order calculated in the previous step on each of the digraphs. Mapped (from, to) key combinations are sent as inputs to the neural network, while the elapsed time is used as the training output. Figure 2 shows the neural network architecture used. The network is a feed forward multi layer perceptrons (MLP). The number of input nodes is 2 representing the from and to mapped keys. The output layer consists of one node, which represents the time needed to perform the digraph. The hidden layer consists of 20 nodes. The back propagation technique is used to train the network.
Figure 1. User enrollment process
A neural network is trained for each of the enrolled users. The weights of the trained networks for all users are saved in a repository for future use during the detection process.
Figure 2. Digraph behavior modeling neural network
The user signature consists of the mapping table and the weights of the trained neural network. This signature is stored and used for identity verification process; Figure 3 describes this process. In this mode the neural network will be loaded with the weights stored in the legitimate user's signature. Each digraph in the monitored session will pass through the mapping component, which utilizes the mapping table provided by the legitimate user's signature. The output of this digraph will be passed as inputs to the trained neural network, which will provide the time needed for the legitimate user to perform this action. The difference between this time and the original time of the monitored digraph represents the deviation from the legitimate user's behavior. The average of this deviation for all of the digraphs in the monitored session will represent how close the behavior calculated in this session is to the legitimate user's behavior. The lower this number the more confident the system is that this session belongs to the same user.
In case of 1 to N identification application, the whole process can be repeated for all of the enrolled users, in each cycle one of the enrolled signatures will be applied, and the signature, which achieves the lowest deviation, will be considered as the closest match to the attacker's identity. If the deviation is low (below a specific threshold) this indicates that this sample belongs to the owner of this signature. Figure 4 illustrates the behavior comparison process for two sessions belonging to two different users when compared to the reference signature of one of them. The figure shows the relation between the key code (according to the sorting order), and the time needed to move from this key to the "A" key on the keyboard. The Y axis represents the output of the neural network after it has been trained with the sorted key order. Figure 4a shows the data collected from one of User 1's sessions compared to his reference signature. Notice that the two curves are close to each other; this indicates similarity of the typing behavior. Figure 4b shows one of User 2's sessions compared to the reference signature of User 1. In order to do this comparison it is mandatory to apply User 1's mapping to the session data prior to passing the data to User 1's neural network. The noticeable deviation between the two curves represents the difference in behavior. We implemented the above recognition system as a distributed client/server application and conducted a wide range experiment involving twenty-two participants. Figure 5 illustrates the hardware setup for the experiment. 16 males and 6 females, with varying computer skills and ages ranging from 13 to 48 years, were involved in this experiment. Each user was asked to install our client software on his workstation and to use the workstation for his daily use throughout the duration of the experiment. The client software was a transparent application with no user interface. The software caches all keystroke dynamics and sends the data to a central server which is located in our lab. The server processes and stores the data in the database for future analysis. The experiment lasted for 9 weeks and we were able to collect an average of 119979 digraphs per user. Figure 6 shows the receiver operating characteristic curve for the main experiment. The curve shows the relation between the false acceptance rate and the false rejection rate for the different possible values of the threshold limit. The optimal threshold limit can be selected from the curve based on an optimization criterion which involves minimizing (FAR, FRR) and giving FAR a priority over FRR. Based on this criterion, as shown by Figure 6 , the optimal performance achieved by our detector was a false acceptance rate (FAR) of 0.0152% and a false rejection rate (FRR) of 4.82%. 
Figure 3. Identity verification process

FUTURE TRENDS
According to a survey conducted by the American Management Association (AMA), over three-quarters of major US companies use some form of employee surveillance technologies. According to the same survey the current trend is to conduct surveillance on an ad hoc basis under the form of random spot checks or as a response to a specific situation rather than in a continuous or systematic way. An explanation for such trend is that spot checking involves less overhead and privacy concerns compared with systematic monitoring. Although continuous monitoring raises more privacy concerns than spot checks, there is a growing interest in systematic monitoring due to the realization that the biggest security challenges are posed by knowledgeable insiders rather than random outsiders. With the decreasing cost of storage and the increasing processing power of computing systems, systematic and continuous monitoring becomes a realistic and affordable possibility for organizations. In this regard, we have developed a prototype client/server application named BIOTRACKER 1 , which implements mouse and keystroke dynamics recognition for the purpose of systematic and continuous monitoring. During the experiment described above we collected (through our client software) mouse dynamics data for the participants (in addition of the keystroke dynamics); the collected data was processed and analyzed to study the biometrics in such data. Mouse dynamics biometrics can be very effective in employee surveillance and monitoring. We refer interested readers to (Ahmed, 2007) for more details about mouse dynamics biometrics. Our current goal is to combine mouse and keystroke dynamics biometrics in a high-performance multimodal biometrics framework which can be used to conduct efficiently and effectively monitoring tasks such as the one described in this chapter. We are currently studying various integration architectures with the purpose of improving significantly the accuracy of the multimodal detector. Future trends will be toward the adoption of ubiquitous, continuous monitoring technologies that combine cost-effective storage and processing capabilities and mitigate privacy concerns at the same time. We intend to meet this challenge through the development of BIOTRACKER.
CONCLUSIONS
Privacy is an important right of any human being. Considering that we spend most of our lives at work, such right should be applicable in some way in the workplace. On the other hand, employers have the legitimate right to take any appropriate measures to ensure safety and productivity in their organizations. Employees' surveillance must strike a balance between privacy and technology effectiveness. To achieve such balance, least invasive or intrusive surveillance technologies should be used, and the information collected should be necessary and not beyond the business purpose. In this chapter, we have discussed the main issues underlying employee surveillance monitoring. We demonstrated the factors characterizing this process and looked at it from different angle to cover privacy and legal issues. We presented a new framework for freetext detection based on keystroke dynamics which is suitable for passive monitoring and identity verification. The use of this framework allows the balancing between surveillance and privacy since all the generated factors are based on the typing dynamics not on the written contents. The presented approach utilizes neural networks to model the user behavior. Our experimental results demonstrate high accuracy of this approach. The framework allows companies to verify or detect the identity of their employees while they are performing their routine work. The evidence collected from this process is very reliable since the decision is based on strong behavioral biometric characteristics.
